
How Nine People Shape Constitutional Law
The Supreme Court speaks through legal opinions. Jeffrey Toobin’s The Nine: Inside the Secret World of the Supreme Court asks readers to look behind those opinions. Who wrote them? Which colleagues had to agree? What beliefs and institutional concerns shaped the result?
First published in 2007, the book follows the Court through the rise of the conservative legal movement and into the early years of Chief Justice John Roberts. It combines political history, major cases, and portraits of the justices. The publisher’s description and opening excerpt establish its scope and sole author.
Toobin’s central argument is that constitutional outcomes depend on the people who interpret the Constitution. Their legal methods matter, but so do their values, experiences, relationships, and views of the Court’s public role. A change in membership can alter the practical meaning of rights without changing the constitutional text.
A Conservative Movement Meets an Unreliable Court
Toobin begins with a political puzzle. Republican presidents appointed justices in the hope of moving constitutional law to the right. Yet some of those appointees helped preserve decisions that conservatives wanted overturned.
The opening chapter traces the development of a more organized conservative legal agenda during the Reagan era. The Federalist Society provided a forum for ideas that challenged the liberal legal establishment. Arguments about federal power, abortion, religion, and judicial interpretation became parts of a sustained movement.
The book distinguishes having an agenda from securing a dependable majority. Winning the presidency could create an appointment opportunity. It could not ensure how a justice would decide every future case. Toobin follows the gap between political expectations and judicial behavior, then asks what changed when Roberts and Samuel Alito arrived.
O’Connor’s Power Came from Her Position
Sandra Day O’Connor is the book’s central figure. She did not lead the Court as chief justice. Her influence came from occupying the position that rival groups often needed to win.
Toobin presents her as a practical conservative with a strong sense of public acceptance. At Louisiana State University, discussing the book, he explained his admiration for her effort to keep the Court from moving too far in one direction. Her outlook reflected an older Republican political tradition, rather than the priorities of the religious right.
A pivotal justice can shape more than the final vote. Colleagues seeking agreement have reasons to narrow their arguments and limit their decisions. This helps explain why an institution can appear conservative overall while producing compromises on highly contested questions.
That influence carries a cost. A compromise can preserve stability while leaving the governing rule difficult to apply. Readers should distinguish a result’s political moderation from the clarity of its legal reasoning.
Casey: Precedent as an Institutional Commitment
The 1992 abortion case Planned Parenthood v. Casey is a defining example. O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter jointly defended the essential holding of Roe v. Wade. All three had been appointed by Republican presidents.
Their opinion retained protection for abortion before fetal viability while allowing substantial regulation. It used the undue burden test: a restriction was invalid if its purpose or effect placed a substantial obstacle in the path of someone seeking a previability abortion. The Court upheld several Pennsylvania requirements but rejected spousal notification. The original opinion records these distinctions.
The case also explains stare decisis, the practice of respecting earlier decisions. The joint opinion treated the Court’s credibility and people’s reliance on existing law as reasons to preserve a central constitutional commitment.
This did not mean that precedent could never change. It meant that disagreement with an earlier decision was insufficient by itself. In the book’s larger story, Casey shows how concern for institutional authority could frustrate a movement expecting Republican appointees to reverse liberal rulings.
Bush v. Gore: The Problem of Credibility
The contested 2000 presidential election places the Court’s claim to independence under extreme pressure. In Bush v. Gore, the Court rejected the Florida recount procedure. A five-justice majority also concluded that a constitutionally acceptable recount could not be completed within the deadline it treated as controlling. The result left George W. Bush’s certified victory in place.
The decision relied on equal protection concerns about inconsistent standards for evaluating ballots. Its reasoning expressly limited its consideration to the circumstances before it.
Toobin judges the intervention harshly. In a 2007 discussion of the book, he argued that conservative justices departed from their usual commitments to state authority and limited equal protection claims. He saw an effort that appeared designed to help one political side. That is his interpretation of the justices’ conduct, rather than a neutral statement of the legal holding.
The episode exposes a weakness in the Court’s position. It must sometimes resolve disputes with enormous political consequences. Yet its authority depends partly on convincing people that its reasoning rests on something more durable than the desired winner. Legal power can settle a case while leaving public trust damaged.
Kennedy: A Pivotal Vote Can Follow Different Principles
The book’s judicial portraits show why political labels alone explain too little. As a contemporary review observes, Toobin combines the struggle over abortion, gay rights, religion, and punishment with accounts of the justices’ distinctive personalities. His Court contains individuals with different priorities, rather than interchangeable members of two teams.
Kennedy illustrates this complexity. In Lawrence v. Texas in 2003, he wrote the majority opinion protecting private, consensual sexual intimacy between adults of the same sex. The Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, which had rejected the earlier constitutional challenge to a sodomy law.
Kennedy’s reasoning connected intimate relationships with liberty and human dignity. O’Connor agreed with the result but used a separate equal protection argument. The opinions therefore show that agreement about an outcome need not mean agreement about its foundation.
This distinction matters when reading any divided decision. A coalition may hold together for one dispute while containing differences that become decisive in the next. The Court’s direction depends on both the number of votes and the reasons supporting them.
Executive Power Tests Judicial Independence
The post-September 11 detention cases add another dimension. A justice’s general conservatism does not automatically determine how much authority that justice will give a president during war.
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld in 2004, O’Connor’s plurality opinion accepted congressional authorization for detention in the narrow circumstances under review. It also required a meaningful opportunity for a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant to contest the factual basis of detention before a neutral decision-maker. The opinion sought to accommodate military needs while preserving a role for judicial review.
The distinction is essential. The Court did not simply prohibit wartime detention. It rejected the idea that executive classification alone removed the need for a meaningful challenge.
Read alongside the book’s political account, the case shows another source of judicial behavior: responsibility for maintaining limits between branches of government. Party affiliation, legal method, and institutional duty can point in different directions.
Replacing One Justice Changes the Available Majority
The arrival of Roberts and Alito gives the narrative its turning point. Roberts succeeded William Rehnquist as chief justice. Alito replaced O’Connor, changing the position that had restrained conservative ambitions in many close cases.
In his Fresh Air interview about the book, Toobin described the early Roberts Court as the beginning of a conservative change that had previously been blocked. He treated O’Connor’s departure as central to that shift.
The 2007 decision Gonzales v. Carhart offers a concrete example. With Kennedy writing for the majority, the Court upheld the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act against the challenges before it. The Act lacked a health exception, although it contained an exception to save the pregnant woman’s life. The decision distinguished an earlier state ban and left room for challenges based on particular medical circumstances.
Toobin reads this period as a change in direction. The practical lesson is that preserving the name of a precedent does not preserve every protection associated with it. The scope of exceptions and the standards for challenging a restriction can change what a right means in practice.
How to Use the Book—and Where to Be Careful
For a general reader, the book suggests several habits of attention. Identify the coalition behind a ruling. Distinguish the result from the reasoning. Ask which earlier decision the Court preserved, narrowed, or rejected. Follow appointments as well as individual cases.
These are reading implications of the narrative, rather than a reform program Toobin supplies. They help explain why constitutional disputes cannot be understood through a list of case names alone.
The reporting also has limits. Toobin relied on interviews with justices and clerks conducted without naming individual sources. That access supports a vivid narrative, but readers cannot independently test every account of private discussion or personal motive. His critical treatment of Bush v. Gore and admiration for O’Connor are visible judgments. They should remain visible when assessing his explanations.
There is also a difference between explaining a decision’s origins and assessing whether its legal reasoning is sound. A personality portrait can illuminate a judge’s choices without resolving a constitutional argument. Readers need the opinions themselves to examine that argument fully.
Finally, this is a historical account. In 2022, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization overruled Roe and Casey. That later decision belongs outside the book’s original story. It reinforces the importance of membership and precedent, but should not be presented as something Toobin documented in 2007.
The book’s enduring contribution is a way to understand judicial authority as a human practice. Constitutional text supplies the framework. Specific people decide how that framework governs real disputes, and their choices acquire force through an institution whose credibility they must also sustain.
Sources
- Penguin Random House: book description, author credit, and opening excerpt.
- Fresh Air: Toobin discusses The Nine, September 19, 2007; CNN: his assessment of Bush v. Gore.
- LSU Law: Toobin discusses O’Connor and the book; Publishers Weekly: contemporary review.
- Original judicial opinions, linked beside the relevant discussions above, verify the historical case outcomes. The Dobbs opinion supplies a clearly separated later development.

